Wuhan 400 in 1981 [712x480 - 894KB] | Poal: Say what you want.

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This is really, really important, so I am going to try to say this carefully. The precise change that occurs with a hop into second order logic is the ability to form relations, that is, something which can logically exist by way of how a first order concept interacts with another first order concept. For example, we'd say that 'love' is a second order relation. I want to connect this to the idea of specification and detachability.

First, in order to do that we need to think of reference. What is it to refer? This is a mysterious phenomenon, which when done properly, constitutes an intentional act. That is, to use a word to stand in for some thing, is what we do when we refer. But as you and I have both been studying Borella recently, he discusses the idea of intellect and, taking great pains, shows that the striving of intellect is always a struggle against difference, ultimately attempting (never perfectly) to identify with what it is that we wish to know by the intellective act. The Word, as it were, is the closest that we can come, and metaphysics itself is the intellect at its most naked. Metaphysics is the intellective act of relating to thingness at its most stripped away reference.

Now, consider what is required for a system to be able to refer, which is to say, that it possess not just language, but the capacity for the intellective act of using this language to refer outside itself. It must transcend itself. The information in the system must be able to hop to a higher order, so to speak, in order to point to its relation to something outside of itself. This is always what language does.

If we are scanning the random sequence of chimpanzee-derived bits, and we happen across the sequence that encodes the human script you set out before, what we have found has not so much to do with the transformability of the 1's and 0's into the human letter groups, as it does with the fact that the 1's and 0's are referring outside of themselves, via a logical syntax, to something else in the world.

The detachable target is just the pointing outside of oneself, demonstrating the intellective act (or if encountered as a sign, then the remnants of the intellective act, as writing for example).

Smith says that the target must be detachable with respect to the fact it can be specified without reference to the broader target. If we take the target to be a bullseye, the important fact is the bullseye can be specified without reference to the overall cork board where the dart can strike at all.

In the case of the program, the detachable target is the presence of a higher order logical form that refers outside of itself.

Now that we've come this far, I really, really want to connect this to the concept I was discussing the other day: symmetry.

In a bit string of length, n, a low probability configuration would be all 1's. This would, along with the outcome of all 0's, represent the highest symmetry states for an n-length string. These also correspond to the lowest Shannon-information states, because they contain the least amount of surprise, therefore the least information. It is just because they are symmetrical that they are low in information. I've written privately (not on Voat or Poal) about a different definition of information content, viewed as a vector quantity. I'd rather say that the configuration of all 1's is high in positive information (which would correspond with low Shannon info). High Shannon information is high negative information, as in high in surprise, therefore we must supply information to resolve it. High positive information, on the other hand, would correspond with symmetry, which is self-resolved for us, and which we receive as a message!

The probability of getting the all 1's configuration is incredibly low in a situation where we'd think there is some surprise, just because such a case would tell us there was, in fact, very little surprise at all (the probability of the all 1's config is only 1/2^n). Whereas the probability of any other sequence not showing this level of symmetry would be (n-2)/2^n.

We find this wherever we find symmetry in nature. If we were to find a perfect circle in nature, this would be analogous to finding the kind of symmetry in a string of all 1's in a fair coin flip. It would immediately communicate intelligence to us because it resolved the negative Shannon information. Instead, symmetry organizes the system 'for us', i.e. there is higher positive information. Set against the chaos of nature, to find a perfect circle in the wild would constitute something like a message, which is precisely how we would take it, that some preternatural cause has "said something" to us.

Further, I want to say that language itself (and its logical syntactical structures) are a special case of symmetry, which obtains as a way of referring to something in an environment and organizing it so as to minimize the Shannon information content - in other words, we increase the positive information of a system by referring to it with language, bringing a kind of order (Logos) to it.

Any production and use of language is an intellective act in which one refers to something. Therefore, to find logical syntax in nature is to find intelligence, because only intelligence can recognize logic. What logic is, is a form of symmetry-making, which happens by reference.

To find an oblong globe shape in nature may still be low probability, but it would lack the symmetry to comprise a 'message', so to speak. A perfect circle, instead, would speak volumes. Likewise, to find a subset of the chimpanzee sequence which encodes human language that is 'meaningful' - that is, it is specified in the sense of having logical syntactical structure combined with semantics - is to find symmetry of a higher order, i.e. that which points outside of itself to symmetrize nature. When I find the perfect circle in nature, I know that I recognize intelligence by the fact that it points outside of itself, to perfect what is not itself perfect, so becoming the specified target - and it shows to me The Good. It communicates a symmetrizing act, the same as meaningful language indicates a symmetrizing act.

Good Lord that was probably a mess. But boy are we getting places, in my opinion. This whole thing had for me a breakthrough sensation. Even if I am not articulating it properly (which I'm almost sure that I'm not), I feel as though I am connecting a few different concepts in ways I haven't before - detachability and CSI to the notion of symmetry, information, intelligence and The Good.

Yes, those passages have a different meaning for me now, especially now that I am able to relate them to seeing in 'my own terms', with the idea of the underlying logical syntactical structure. What we're really talking about here, it seems to me now, is the notion of *higher order*, the same as we do in logic. This is really, really important, so I am going to try to say this carefully. The precise change that occurs with a hop into second order logic is the ability to form relations, that is, something which can logically exist by way of how a first order concept interacts with another first order concept. For example, we'd say that 'love' is a second order relation. I want to connect this to the idea of specification and detachability. First, in order to do that we need to think of *reference*. What is it *to refer*? This is a mysterious phenomenon, which when done *properly*, constitutes an *intentional act*. That is, to use a word to stand in for some thing, is what we do when we refer. But as you and I have both been studying Borella recently, he discusses the idea of *intellect* and, taking great pains, shows that the striving of intellect is *always* a struggle against difference, ultimately attempting (never perfectly) to identify with what it is that we wish to know by the intellective act. The *Word*, as it were, is the closest that we can come, and metaphysics itself is the intellect at its most naked. Metaphysics is the intellective act of relating to thingness at its most stripped away reference. Now, consider what is required for a system to be able to refer, which is to say, that it possess not just language, but the capacity for the intellective act of using this language to refer outside itself. It must transcend itself. The information in the system must be able to hop to a higher order, so to speak, in order to *point to* its relation to something outside of itself. This is always what language does. If we are scanning the random sequence of chimpanzee-derived bits, and we happen across the sequence that encodes the human script you set out before, what we have found has not so much to do with the transformability of the 1's and 0's into the human letter groups, as it does with the fact that the 1's and 0's are referring outside of themselves, via a logical syntax, to something else in the world. The *detachable* target is just the *pointing outside* of oneself, demonstrating the intellective act (or if encountered as a *sign*, then the remnants of the intellective act, as writing for example). Smith says that the target must be detachable with respect to the fact it can be specified without reference to the broader target. If we take *the* target to be a bullseye, the important fact is the bullseye can be specified without reference to the overall cork board where the dart can strike at all. In the case of the program, the detachable target is the presence of a higher order logical form that refers outside of itself. Now that we've come this far, I really, really want to connect this to the concept I was discussing the other day: **symmetry**. In a bit string of length, n, a low probability configuration would be all 1's. This would, along with the outcome of all 0's, represent the highest symmetry states for an n-length string. These also correspond to the lowest Shannon-information states, because they contain the least amount of surprise, therefore the least information. **It is just because they are symmetrical that they are low in information.** I've written privately (not on Voat or Poal) about a different definition of information content, viewed as a vector quantity. I'd rather say that the configuration of all 1's is high in *positive* information (which would correspond with low Shannon info). High Shannon information is high *negative* information, as in high in surprise, therefore we must *supply* information to resolve it. High positive information, on the other hand, would correspond with symmetry, which is self-resolved for us, and which we receive as a message! The probability of getting the all 1's configuration is incredibly low in a situation where we'd think there is some surprise, just because such a case would tell us there was, in fact, very little surprise at all (the probability of the all 1's config is only 1/2^n). Whereas the probability of any other sequence not showing this level of symmetry would be (n-2)/2^n. We find this wherever we find symmetry in nature. If we were to find a perfect circle in nature, this would be analogous to finding the kind of symmetry in a string of all 1's in a fair coin flip. It would immediately communicate intelligence to us because it resolved the negative Shannon information. Instead, symmetry organizes the system 'for us', i.e. there is higher *positive* information. Set against the chaos of nature, to find a perfect circle in the wild would constitute something like **a message**, which is precisely how we would take it, that some preternatural cause has "said something" to us. Further, I want to say that language itself (and its logical syntactical structures) are a special case of symmetry, which obtains as a way of referring to something in an environment and organizing it so as to minimize the Shannon information content - in other words, we increase the positive information of a system by referring to it with language, bringing a kind of **order (Logos)** to it. Any production and use of language is an intellective act in which one refers to something. Therefore, to find logical syntax in nature is to find intelligence, because only intelligence can recognize logic. What logic *is*, is a form of symmetry-making, which happens by reference. To find an oblong globe shape in nature may still be low probability, but it would lack the symmetry to comprise a 'message', so to speak. A perfect circle, instead, would speak volumes. Likewise, to find a subset of the chimpanzee sequence which encodes human language that is 'meaningful' - that is, it is specified in the sense of having logical syntactical structure combined with semantics - is to find symmetry of a higher order, i.e. that which points outside of itself to symmetrize nature. When I find the *perfect* circle in nature, I know that I recognize intelligence by the fact that it points outside of itself, **to perfect what is not itself perfect, so becoming the specified target** - **and it shows to me The Good**. It communicates a symmetrizing act, the same as meaningful language indicates a symmetrizing act. Good Lord that was probably a mess. But boy are we getting places, in my opinion. This whole thing had for me a breakthrough sensation. Even if I am not articulating it properly (which I'm almost sure that I'm not), I feel as though I am connecting a few different concepts in ways I haven't before - detachability and CSI to the notion of symmetry, information, intelligence and The Good. @ARM

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