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132

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[–] 2 pts (edited )

They could actually make this pretty secure - if they wanted to. All it takes is for a registered voter to be required to submit their name and address to the Web site. Upon verifying registration status the system uses the Secretary of State's secret key to sign the voter's ID and a unique GUID for that ballot and prints it in a barcode on the ballot. Now a print-at-home ballot is still tied to a voter and authenticated by the Secretary of State with a cryptographic signature that can be checked by anybody with the SoS's public key.

Now there can be no ballots that aren't legitimate ballots. You stop double-counting by flagging all ballots with duplicate voter IDs. The only way for fraud is for the SoS to be in on it, and that's pretty easy to prove.

[–] [deleted] 5 pts

We watched programmers go in to a Diebold voting machine and switch votes back in the 90s.

The fraud isnt occuring because we dont know how to secure elections.

[–] 0 pt

We know how to secure them (starts with paper and pencil), but that isn't the goal.

[–] 3 pts

The ballots aren't technically the issue. The people counting the ballots and the people reporting the fraudlent "results."